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On a cold November day in Beijing in 1914, in a fragile Republic of China not yet two years 
old, the prominent reformist scholar and journalist Liang Qichao 梁启超 (1873–1929) 
delivered a speech at Tsinghua School 清华学堂 (later to become Tsinghua University 清华
大学) urging the Chinese people to strengthen the nation through the ancient model of the 
junzi 君子 (Confucian gentleman).1 In his talk, Liang drew attention to the central role that 
the gentlemanly ideal played in the education systems of powerful and prosperous Britain and 
America. By setting the junzi as its standard, he argued that China could similarly raise up the 
“personality of the Chinese people” (guomin zhi ren’ge 国民之人格).2 Quoting the Book of 
Changes (Yijing 易经), Liang said: “As heaven maintains vigor through movements, a junzi 
should constantly strive for self-perfection; as earth's condition is receptive devotion, a junzi 
should hold the outer world with broad mind.” Liang’s talk made such an impact that 
Tsinghua School abbreviated these phrases and adopted them as the school motto, translated 
succinctly into English as “Self-Discipline and Social Commitment.” In 1917 the abbreviated 
phrases were engraved in large characters on a school crest set into the stage in the main 
assembly hall as an encouragement to students.3  
Notwithstanding the endorsements of Liang Qichao and Tsinghua School, many 
reformist scholars and writers in following generations attacked the junzi ideal because they 
believed that Confucian dogma had “nurtured a ‘national character’ (guominxing 国民性) 
detrimental to China’s modernization.”4 National salvation was held to depend in no small 
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measure on the rejection of Confucian “scholar-official” (shidafu 士大夫) masculinity and 
the adoption of Western business and lifestyle practices: “the scholar of old was considered 
unsuited to the modern world.”5 The new middle class that emerged in Shanghai in the 1920s 
and ‘30s similarly turned towards Western commercial masculinities and away from 
embedded Chinese models of manhood.6  
After the Communist victory in 1949, some scholars advocated the relevance of 
certain Confucian principles to socialism, including the junzi model, but anti-Confucian, 
class-based, socialist perspectives came to dominate discourse on Confucianism during the 
Cultural Revolution towards the end of the Mao era.7 The reintroduction of capitalism to 
China in the 1980s and ‘90s spurred the emergence of the “new junzi”: professionals and 
businessmen who legitimized their quest for material wealth by reinterpreting Confucianism 
as an ethical system compatible with doing business.8 More recently, junzi masculinity has 
been further boosted by the proliferation of Confucian ideas in television programs, self-help 
books, popular philosophy guides, online articles, “national studies” (guoxue 国学) university 
degrees, and ethics classes in private schools.  
Drawing on the concept of cultural nationalism, I argue in this paper that the 
promotion of the junzi ideal is a form of political, social and cultural identity-making that 
seeks to “validate and moralize” a particular view of national culture.9 In particular, I argue 
that the masculine figure of the junzi has become a significant touchstone in the educated 
elite’s cultural nationalist reimaginings of China’s society and polity.10 Intellectuals and 
professionals are keen to associate themselves with a reinvigorated junzi masculinity in order 
to enhance their status inside and beyond China in the context of increasing globalization and 
marketization. This paper contributes to existing literature by showing how highly educated 
Chinese men are reworking the figure of the junzi in their quest to shape cultural nationalist 
discourses in their gender and class interests.  
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The new junzi masculinity does not simply act to legitimize educated men’s 
participation in the business world, it also offers a reassuringly well-anchored Chinese 
identity in fast-changing transnational environments, as well as privileged class status in 
China's ongoing large-scale socioeconomic transformations. Middle-class men not only wish 
to distinguish themselves from migrant workers, farmers, and the urban working classes, but 
also from the coarse baofahu 暴发户 (“nouveau riche”) and the wealthy but corrupt heiling
黑领 (“black collars”).11 Claiming the moral high ground through Confucian values and suzhi 
gao 素质高 (“high quality”) behavior positions highly educated men as heirs to the long 
Chinese tradition of elite masculinity, which distinguishes them from other groups of men 
within and beyond China. Fitting a global pattern in the emerging middle classes, it also 
enables them to reconcile the material and the moral by portraying themselves, their lifestyles 
and their methods of earning money as morally respectable.12 
With a focus on junzi masculinity in texts and subjectivity formation, this paper 
examines recently published major works on the junzi by prominent public intellectuals 
associated with the promulgation of “traditional cultural values” in post-Tiananmen China,13 
as well as the ways in which middle-class professional Chinese men negotiate the junzi ideal 
as part of their cultural identity. The paper explores the significance of the junzi revival for 
contemporary class, gender and transcultural relations, and contributes to understandings of 
elite cultural nationalism in China. 
 
The post-Mao Confucian resurgence and cultural nationalism 
The post-Mao new junzi view that “moral management” justifies the pursuit of wealth has its 
antecedents in earlier arguments by Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) and Qing Dynasty (1644–
1911) “Confucian merchants” (rushang 儒商), who positioned “righteousness” (yi 义) and 
“profit” (li 利) as equals in harmony with one another. When the latter years of the Ming 
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Dynasty saw substantial population and economic growth but no commensurate expansion in 
the number of officials, increasing numbers of scholars turned to commerce as a means to 
support themselves.14 The Confucian merchants reinterpreted the relationship of 
righteousness and profit from one of opposition to one of duality, although their revision did 
not at that time displace mainstream Confucian ideological disapproval of the pursuit of 
profit through business. In the post-Mao era, many intellectuals and scholars have joined 
others in “entering the sea (of business)” (xiahai 下海) to make money for themselves. The 
infusion of morally elevated elements into the contemporary business sphere legitimizes 
profitmaking in the eyes of a Chinese cultural elite traditionally hostile to commerce, and has 
become a salient feature of pro-business discourse in the post-Mao era.15 
The revitalization of the junzi ideal and Confucianism in recent years has become 
evident across multiple spheres of life in China, not just in business discourses. During the 
1990s, the Confucian revival grew in intensity as intellectuals engaged in a post-Tiananmen 
“national studies fever” (guoxue re 国学热).16 Prominent examples include the popular TV 
programs and best-selling books of Beijing academic Yu Dan 于丹 (1965–), in which she 
promotes Confucian concepts as psychological aids for attaining peace of mind in today’s 
stressful world; the proliferation of national studies curricula across all stages of state 
education; and the establishment of thousands of private schools throughout China teaching 
Confucian classics, ethics and associated activities such as calligraphy to all ages of 
students.17 Marc Moskowitz provides an instance of the uptake of junzi ideas in everyday life 
in his ethnography of Weiqi 围棋 (Go) players in Beijing. He shows that middle-class, 
university-educated Weiqi players, whom he found to be overwhelmingly male, are explicitly 
drawing on historical, idealized notions of the junzi in their performance of a gentlemanly 
Weiqi masculinity, which even extends to how they hold themselves as they walk.18  
Historically, the junzi was gendered male in normative discourse; and the kinds of 
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activities associated with the junzi, such as Weiqi, were beyond the realm of women’s 
possible pursuits.19 Some contemporary voices maintain that the junzi should remain a male 
preserve, and that the equivalent term for women is shunü 淑女 (“virtuous woman”).20 
However, high-profile commentators such as Yu Dan tend to present the junzi ideal in 
gender-neutral terms, as a potential aspiration for anybody. Nonetheless, regardless of the 
emergence of gender-equitable rhetoric in junzi discourse, Moskowitz’s ethnographic 
findings suggest that in contemporary everyday life in China it is men who are 
overwhelmingly likely to identify with junzi characteristics. The junzi ideal therefore appears 
destined to continue its historical trajectory as a predominantly masculine model of 
cultivation. 
The concept of cultural nationalism offers a productive way of understanding current 
reworkings of the junzi ideal, as well as Confucianism more broadly and other aspects of 
“traditional culture.” Kosaku Yoshino defines cultural nationalism as the belief that a 
distinctive “cultural community” with its own unique history and characteristics is the 
“essence of a nation,” and argues that cultural nationalists seek to “regenerate” a nation’s 
cultural identity when it is perceived to be weak or under threat.21 Yingjie Guo identifies 
“historical narratives, commemorative ceremonies, arts and literature, and collective 
memory” as important sites of cultural nationalist identity-making, drawing from Richard 
Madsen’s suggestions on the fora through which scholars can examine how community 
actors as well as the state produce ideas and contest concepts.22 Cultural nationalism can be 
implicitly or explicitly linked to ethnic nationalism, in that particular cultural values may be 
associated with a certain “people,” which can therefore be used to police who belongs and 
who does not to a particular ethnic identity.23 This kind of ethno-cultural nationalism is 
manifestly predicated on “othering” and exclusion. The activities and concepts promoted in 
ethno-culturalist discourses are manifold, and can include practices that may be treated as 
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mundane in most cultures, such as bathing customs, which as Lesley Wynn shows, have 
come to be considered a definitive component of national identity in Japan.24 
In early twentieth-century China, Liang Qichao was a seminal proponent of ideas of 
race and nation, which he understood in terms of the Darwinian sociology of Herbert Spencer 
(1820–1903). If Chinese people did not rally around the idea of the national unity of China, 
then the country was doomed to be destroyed by peoples with a stronger sense of themselves 
as a nation. In his influential series of essays written between 1902 and 1906 titled “On a 
New People,” Liang advocated a new kind of moral relationship between individual and 
country.25 To provide a conceptual vocabulary for this, he introduced the Japanese term 
minzu 民族 into Chinese as the term for “nation”, inspired by its use from the start of Japan’s 
modernizing programme in the 1860s.26 Liang promoted the expression Zhonghua minzu 中
华民族 (“Chinese nation”), which was enthusiastically taken up by Kuomintang 国民党 
nationalists Sun Yatsen 孙中山 (1866–1925) and then Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石 (1887–1975) 
before falling from favour in Mao-era political discourse.27 In recent years, however, the 
Chinese authorities have reinvoked the concept of Zhonghua minzu as a singular national 
peoplehood to serve as a unitary cultural nationalist identity in contrast to the framework of 
fifty-six diverse nationalities within one socialist China created during the Mao era. The term 
Zhonghua minzu subsumes Tibetan, Uighur, Mongolian, Miao and the other ethnicities as 
defined by Mao-era scholars within one overarching, Han-dominated, Chinese cultural nation, 
and is projected back thousands of years into the past.28  
Cultural nationalism in China since the 1990s has been characterized as both anti-
Western (especially anti-US) and anti-Marxist.29 It has taken shape in a context of rising self-
confidence in China’s cultural traditions among intellectuals as a result of China’s rapid 
economic development, and of suspicion towards perceived cultural overreach of the US in 
processes of globalization processes.30 Since 1991, the Chinese government’s program of 
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Patriotic Education has created ideal breeding grounds for exclusory ethnic and cultural 
nationalism. The willingness of China’s intellectual class in recent decades to engage with 
Western political and cultural theories might be seen as an ameliorating factor, yet this does 
not necessarily produce pro-Western viewpoints or liberalization teleologies, since theories 
developed in the West, such as postcolonialism and orientalism, can be used against the 
West.31 Western theories are not necessarily deployed to undermine cultural nationalist 
reimaginings of the junzi: as my analysis of Chinese public intellectuals’ works below shows, 
they are by contrast used to render reworked junzi models more convincing. 
   
Methodology 
My focus is this paper is the way in which the model of the junzi has been reformulated in 
contemporary cultural nationalist texts by public intellectuals. As such, it takes a broadly 
Foucauldian approach to discourse, with the understanding that discourses act to 
produce/construct particular identities. Taking up Yingjie Guo’s approach that looks beyond 
statist formulations of cultural nationalism, it principally examines two recent works that 
stand out in the increasing volume of writing on the junzi, and the responses of a professional 
Chinese man in London to the concept of the junzi that relate to cultural nationalist tenets. 
Three characteristics underpin the selection of the texts. Firstly, the foregrounding of the 
concept of the junzi in book-length projects; secondly, the wide market reach of the books; 
and thirdly, the prominence of the authors, who are both well-known public intellectuals. A 
third work by a less well-known author is also subsequently discussed due to its very explicit 
positioning of the junzi within a racialized cultural nationalist framework. I critically analyse 
the texts with a view to building a picture of their multi-faceted constructions of cultural 
nationalist junzi masculinity. At the same time, the analysis also confirms the cultural 
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nationalist characteristics of the texts, in line with the above discussion on cultural 
nationalism. 
The professional Chinese man whose responses I examine below was interviewed as 
part of a larger research project conducted in 2014/15 on the masculine subjectivities of 
Chinese professional men in London. The project involved narrative interviews with ten 
highly-educated professional Chinese men who had come to the UK to study or work. Two of 
the participants aspired to emulate the junzi model of masculinity, and four others expressed 
strong attachment to conventional Confucian virtues such as filial piety, familial 
responsibility and self-control. Participants were recruited through bilingual adverts in 
Chinese and English circulated by community organizations, friends and associates. I carried 
out recorded individual interviews with all the participants for between one and two hours, 
and had more informal follow-up discussions with five of the participants. Data collection 
and analysis were conducted according to narrative research methods.32 In common with 
much qualitative research writing, my approach recognizes that individual subjectivities are 
created through everyday processes of negotiation and contestation of discursive identities. 
And further, that accounts of personal experiences and understandings elicited in interviews 
are not pre-formed, but are co-created in the “social encounter” between the interviewer and 
research participant.33 
 
Junzi as Jungian archetype 
Yu Qiuyu 余秋雨 (1946–) is a Chinese scholar, writer and commentator whose views on 
Chinese culture have been influential since the early 1990s when he published Wenhua ku lü 
文化苦旅 (“A bitter journey through culture”) (1992), which includes essays lamenting the 
historical neglect of China’s cultural heritage that have become set texts in Chinese 
secondary schools.34 In his recent book, Junzi zhi dao 君子之道 (“Way of the gentleman”) 
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(2014), Yu argues that the junzi is the key to Chinese culture. Echoing Liang Qichao, he 
makes the concept of personality central to his argument. He anoints the junzi as the 
“collective personality of Chinese culture” (Zhonghua wenhua de jiti renge 中华文化的集体
人格) in order to bring clarity, as he sees it, to debates about the fundamental nature of the 
Chinese people.35 The logic underpinning Yu’s argument runs thus: if “personality” (ren’ge 
人格) is the “ultimate achievement of culture” (wenhua de zhongji chengguo 文化的终极成
果),36 then the ultimate achievement of Chinese culture is “Chinese people’s collective 
personality” (Zhongguoren de jiti ren’ge 中国人的集体人格), and it therefore follows that 
the “rejuvenation of Chinese culture” (fuxing Zhonghua wenhua 复兴中华文化) requires the 
search for and “optimisation” (youhua 优化) of Chinese people’s collective personality.37 Yu 
espouses and promotes a cultural form of nationalism, yet is at the same time a cosmopolitan 
writer: he refers widely to Western authors and their concepts in order to support his 
arguments about the junzi, and particularly draws from the notions of the collective 
unconscious and collective personality that Jung derived from Freud’s work on the 
unconscious/subconscious. In his book on junzi, rather than deploying postmodernism and 
other theories against the West, Yu’s strategy is to mine the Western academy for conceptual 
frameworks that can bolster his positioning of the junzi at the forefront of a Chinese cultural 
nationalist paradigm. 
And yet Yu is quick to denounce the use of Western theories when he feels they are 
being used to critique the traditional Chinese canon. As Yu relates in his book, in the mid 
1930s Jung met Hu Shi 胡适 (1891–1962), the reformist philosopher and prominent figure in 
the May Fourth and New Culture movements of the 1910s and ‘20s. During the ensuing 
conversation, Jung asked Hu about his feelings towards the Book of Changes, the very text 
from which Liang Qichao plucked the junzi quotations that became the Tsinghua motto. In 
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his response to Jung, Hu disparaged the Book of Changes as a form of magic and amulet. Yu 
is infuriated by this, claiming that Hu’s comments were “sloppy” (caoshuai 草率) and an 
inappropriate application of “Western modern scientific thinking” (xifang jindai kexue siwei 
西方近代科学思维).38 Yu contrasts Hu’s attitude to the Book of Changes with Jung’s, who, 
in his introduction to Richard Wilhem’s 1923 German translation, sets out reasons for taking 
it seriously.39 Yu approves of Jung’s starting point, which is that the personalities of Western 
and Chinese people are different. For Yu, the personality of the saint (shengtu ren’ge 圣徒人
格) and the personality of the gentleman (shenshi ren’ge 绅士人格) are the salient examples 
of collective personality in the West, but, as mentioned above, the collective Chinese 
personality is the junzi.40 This idea aligns neatly with Liang Qichao’s argument in his 
Tsinghua speech one hundred years previously that the junzi model is most suited to the task 
of “raising up the personality” of the Chinese people. 
Yu sees the junzi as the most profound “personality mode” (ren’ge moshi 人格模式) 
to have emerged from early Chinese culture.41 Drawing on Jung, he claims China as the 
“homeland” (guxiang 故乡) of the junzi, and, argues that over time the concept of the junzi 
has become a deeply buried “archetype” (yuanxing 原型) in the collective unconscious of the 
Chinese people.42 He describes how Confucians turned it into a “personality ideal” (ren’ge 
lixiang 人格理想), into which, he believes, all of Chinese culture’s “high points” (liangdian 
亮点) have been absorbed.43 Indeed, Confucian, can be concisely summarized as the way of 
the junzi, according to Yu, and as such, the junzi is the sine qua non of Chinese culture: if 
there are junzi, Yu states, then all can be had; but without junzi, everything is futile.44 Yu 
firmly links the junzi personality with being Chinese, suggesting it is the cultural aspiration of 
all Chinese: “to be a junzi is to be the most qualified, most ideal Chinese person.”45 He even 
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goes as far as to claim that it is solely the existence of junzi that prevents the dying off of 
Chinese culture, because the junzi provides such a strong model personality. 
 This suggests Yu understands “culture” as a kind of high form of ideals and practices 
that are generated, transmitted, and protected by a highly educated elite. This differs from the 
approach of populist Confucianists like Yu Dan, who try to integrate Confucianism into 
everyday mass culture, turning it into a kind of self-help Confucianism-lite for daily use. This 
latter approach presupposes a more postmodern, consumerist take on cultural practices, and 
lacks the sustained, lifelong self-cultivation that Yu Qiuyu advocates. It appears that Yu 
Qiuyu is writing for an audience that wishes to reflect more deeply on the significance of the 
junzi model for Chinese culture: those, one might assume, that Yu believes have the potential 
to become junzi. 
Confucians have often approached the attributes of the junzi through defining the 
junzi’s opposite: the xiaoren 小人 (“small person”).46 Without the xiaoren as the junzi’s 
Other, it could be argued that the junzi cannot exist. In Yu’s words, “the divide between the 
junzi and the xiaoren makes the junzi, this ideal personality, more solid.”47 Yu relates that in 
ancient times, xiaoren was not necessarily a derogatory term: it referred to those with low 
social status . Eventually, however, he argues that the difference between the two concepts 
came to be defined as one of personality or “moral character” (renpin 人品).48 By framing 
the difference as a matter of morality, Yu avoids the common characterisation of the junzi as 
attached to righteousness and the xiaoren as attached to profit. Yu’s shift of emphasis away 
from associating money making with a xiaoren mentality is in line with post-Mao (and 
antecedent) efforts to reconcile Confucianism, and the junzi, with commercial activities.  
Within one group of people, even within one person, Yu argues, there can be a contest 
between junzi and xiaoren components.49 To support this point, Yu cites Tang dynasty 
historian Wu Jing’s 吴兢 (670–749) concise formulation: “the junzi does good deeds; the 
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xiaoren does evil deeds” (xing shanshi ze wei junzi, xing eshi ze wei xiaoren 行善事则为君
子，行恶事则为小人).50 Thus, for Yu, the difference between the junzi and the xiaoren is 
not a difference between two stable social groups, but that exhibited by “a momentary slip in 
our innermost being” (neixin de yi nian zhi cha 内心的一念之差); in other words, between 
the good or bad behavior of individuals.51 Yu thus deftly psychologizes the junzi/xiaoren 
dichotomy in a way that could be used to deflect critiques of the junzi as socially divisive or 
reminiscent of feudal hierarchies. Yu argues that the only thing anyone has any real control 
over is himself or herself. Cultivating one’s moral character is thus the kernel of Confucian 
teaching, as it is not possible to be fully successful in managing family affairs, ruling the 
country and bringing peace to all under heaven, as the traditional Confucian formula sets out. 
Through a focus on cherishing virtue for his own benefit, in Yu’s view, the junzi can go forth 
to benefit others, and, indeed, to benefit the whole world.52 Yu’s approach speaks multiply to 
modern notions of personhood, to middle-class concerns about their own moral standards, 
and to contemporary feelings among professional and intellectual men of a loss of control 
and influence in the family and beyond.  
A final salient point to note about Yu’s reformulation of the junzi as collective 
personality ideal of the Chinese nation is his integration into the junzi model of elements of 
Buddhism. For Yu, Buddhism is a core component of China’s cultural heritage. Buddhist 
tenets complement the way of the junzi, and the junzi should keep close to Buddhism. Yu is 
concerned that during the practice of self-cultivation there is a danger that the practitioner 
will become  too self-centred; Buddhist texts and concepts, such as the notion of “emptiness” 
(kong 空) set out in the Heart Sutra, can help overcome this potential weakness in the practice 
of junzi self-cultivation.53 The potential for Buddhism to act to some extent in tandem with 
Confucianism in endorsing the worth of self-cultivation and filial piety is clearly 
demonstrated in the characteristics of the remarkable Buddhist renaissance in Taiwan in 
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recent decades.54 It is no coincidence, therefore, that Yu has taken especial efforts to promote 
his book on the junzi to Taiwanese Buddhist audiences.55 
To some, Yu Qiuyu’s views may appeal as a timely reworking of the neglected 
historical concept of the junzi as a counterweight to the encroachment of Western models of 
personality in China. Yet viewed from another angle, Yu’s enthusiastic promotion of the 
junzi as the collective personality ideal for the Chinese nation demonstrates a desire among 
Chinese intellectuals and China’s highly-educated professionals to renegotiate more 
favourably their fragile status in an increasingly commercialized Chinese society, and to 
better place themselves as the guardians and paragons of a national Chinese culture in what 
could be described as a intensely competitive global “soft power” marketplace.56 In short, by 
drawing on China’s deeply significant Confucian historical tradition to promote the junzi role 
as the essence of Chinese culture, highly-educated Chinese men like Yu are attempting to 
solidify and enhance their social status and political power in today’s fast-changing world.  
 
Calling for a “junzi nation” 
Yao Zhongqiu 姚中秋 (1966–) is a Confucian scholar, economist, public intellectual, and 
President of the Unirule Institute of Economics (Beijing tianze jingji yanjiusuo 北京天则经
济研究所). The Unirule Institute is a Beijing social sciences think tank committed to 
promoting market economics, founded in 1993 by Mao Yushi 茅于轼 (1929–), a champion 
of economic liberalization and deregulation who is reviled by the Chinese left. Yao’s 2012 
book Meide; junzi; fengsu 美德・君子・风俗 (“Virtue; junzi; social customs”) proposes the 
junzi ideal as the foundation on which he believes Chinese society should build its future. In 
his book, Yao critiques three paradigms of governance: what he calls “system determinism” 
(zhidu juedinglun 制度决定论), which enforces conformity with a dominant system (it is 
likely that Yao has socialism in his sights here); “cultural determinism” (wenhua juedinglun 
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文化决定论), especially in the form that holds that Western cultural values need to be 
adopted in China to change society for the better, because as a Confucian he does not agree 
that culture is wholly responsible for all change; and “civil society construction doctrine” 
(gongmin shehui jianshelun 公民社会建设论), which holds that through marketization, 
urbanization and the expansion of the middle class, people are trained into being better 
citizens. Yao criticizes this last doctrine because in his view it neglects the training of 
“private citizens” (simin 私民), without which he argues there cannot be “public citizens” 
(gongmin 公民).57	  
In this book, Yao puts forward a Confucian theory for building society, which he 
describes as using Confucian doctrines of human nature as its cornerstone, putting the junzi at 
the centre, and taking social customs as its means.58 With an unashamedly elitist tenor, Yao 
defines the junzi as “people with outstanding moral conduct” (dexing chuzhongzhe 德行出众
者), the opposite of whom he calls “ordinary people” (fanren 凡人), although he also refers at 
times to xiaoren.59 For Yao, junzi are particularly strongly disposed towards being supportive 
of others, are skilled in such endeavours, and are therefore the people who set up, organize 
and lead groups, and who produce and allocate public goods. In Yao’s vision of a junzi-led 
society, ordinary people also learn the necessary basic morality and conduct for the 
maintenance of social order, and through participating in public affairs develop from “private 
citizens” into “public citizens.”60 In this way, a social fabric is gradually developed that has 
the junzi at the centre, surrounded in ever-increasing circles by family, community, 
workplace, region, country, and ultimately the whole word, and which maintains a social 
order that is “diverse yet harmonious” (he er bu tong 和而不同).61  
 Yao is aware that his emphasis on the junzi may incite the accusation that he is 
endorsing social inequality. But he strongly believes, in a very similar way to Yu Qiuyu, that 
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the presuppositions of contemporary (Western) mainstream social science are inappropriate 
and inaccurate when it comes to understanding China’s history and reality.62 Consequently, 
Yao argues provocatively that the fields of Chinese humanities and social sciences have been 
and continue to be warped by what he sees as their word-for-word copying of the outside 
world, whether Soviet, German, Japanese, British or American, a world of which he argues 
Chinese intellectuals only have a superficial understanding. For Yao, Confucian thinking, by 
contrast, can lead people to “more aptly and accurately understand theoretical paradigms for 
human nature, society, and order in contemporary China.”63 
As with Yu Qiuyu, Yao Zhongqiu harbours no doubts about the benefits of the junzi 
for Chinese culture and society and the importance of the junzi for the fate of the nation. Yet 
Yao also goes further than Yu by including an urgent requirement to build a “junzi 
community” (junzi qunti 君子群体), arguing that for China to rebuild a “superior social 
order” (youliang zhixu 优良秩序) and to undertake its “mission in world history” (shijie lishi 
zhi shiming 世界历史之使命), the cultivation of a junzi community is a pressing task.”64 His 
desire to build such a community fits Yoshino’s paradigm, described above, in which cultural 
nationalists define a particular “cultural community” as the core of the nation. Yao goes as 
far as to assert that China’s future civilization and strength depend ultimately on the 
cultivation of a certain scale of junzi community.65 Making the bold claim that without junzi 
there can be no governance, Yao argues that the words and actions of the junzi are the 
fundamental mechanisms for shaping the moral, rational and good behavior of the future 
Chinese citizenry.66 As was the case in premodern China, Yao argues for scholar politicians, 
summing up his notion of the junzi’s role in one simple term: “scholar official” (shidafu): the 
very figure that the early twentieth century New Culture Movement intellectuals were keen to 
eradicate.67  
Yet, for Yao, as with Yu, the junzi of today is not a simple replica of the junzi of old. 
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At the heart of Yao’s conceptualization of the contemporary junzi lies a class distinction 
predicated on moral quality. Even if contemporary society aims for gender, education and 
wage equality, Yao argues, there are still differences in people’s natural capacities, which can 
be physical, mental and moral. Yao embraces a purer notion of junzi-hood than Yu, seeing 
the capacities of individuals in more clear-cut terms than Yu. For Yao argues that people can 
be categorized as possessing either high or low “moral conduct” (dexing 德行), hence the 
division between the junzi and xiaoren.68 However, as with Yu Qiuyu, Yao stresses this 
division in terms of moral character and self-cultivation, rather than the historical dichotomy 
of righteousness-profit. Yao argues that as with the aristocracies of Western countries an 
emphasis on equality does not render the junzi superfluous, but merely transforms the 
justification of his role as guardian of the social order from birthright to his elevated personal 
“quality” (pinzhi 品质).69  
A morally elevated junzi stratum must therefore govern the xiaoren, Yao argues, as 
the latter, being less cultivated, are captives of their material desires. There is public appetite 
for the society-wide promulgation of junzi attributes, Yao claims, citing a 2012 opinion poll 
in the China Youth Daily in which 71% of respondents believed that junzi moral integrity 
could help rebuild Chinese citizens’ morality and values, and 87% hoped that junzi education 
would be strengthened.70 Yao’s cultural nationalism manifests very clearly in his use of the 
term “junzi nation” (junzi zhi bang 君子之邦), expressing his hope for a Chinese future in 
which “junzi-style” (junzi shi 君子式) businessmen, lawyers, politicians and scholars will 
utilize the “way of the junzi” to enable China to harmonize its relations with all nations and to 
“display a world-leading role appropriate to China’s size.”71 
Despite his dismissal of Western academia’s inappropriateness for understanding 
Chinese society, Yao, like Yu, is quick to use Western theories when he feels that they 
strengthen his arguments. For example, Yao is strongly influenced by the Austrian classical 
	   17 
liberal economist Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992). Yao relates that after the 1940s Hayek took 
Scottish moral philosophy as his basis for thinking through self-cognition, society, the market, 
law, politics and so on, and argues that while Scottish moral philosophy is the ethics of the 
(British) gentleman, Confucian philosophy is the ethics of the junzi.72 Developing this idea, 
Yao states that the basis of society should be woven around the junzi and the gentleman. The 
moral conduct of the junzi or gentleman naturally forms a junzi or gentleman-centred social 
order, which is the foundation of the government. Politics, then, is the bridge between the 
junzi or gentleman-centred social order and the government.73 Yao draws from eighteenth 
century Ulster-Scots philosopher Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) to bolster his claim that 
government should be composed of people with junzi virtues, approvingly citing Hutcheson’s 
notion that ordinary people naturally put their trust in highly able, courageous, moral, wise, 
benevolent and social ethics-oriented people, believing them to be responsible public officials 
and having confidence in their ability to manage social affairs.74 
Yao’s predilection for the free-market oriented Austrian School of economics leads 
him to align the junzi or gentleman with what he calls the Austrian School’s “rule-making 
entrepreneur” (lifa qiyejia 立法企业家), which he derives from studies of the formation of 
institutions by Carl Menger (1840–1921), the founder of the Austrian School.75 Yao suggests 
these junzi entrepreneurs could compete with each other to come up with programmes for the 
authorities. Further influenced by Hayek’s notion of spontaneous order, Yao argues that 
although the setting up of a constitution which has a junzi-centred social order is a man-made 
artifice, it also belongs to Hayek’s spontaneous social order, as everyone is allowed—in 
theory—to put forward their opinions.76 It is likely that Yao is trying here to distinguish his 
vision from top-down systems like socialism. Yao holds that the mix of constitutional politics 
and conventions in his junzi-centered spontaneous order, which he likens to the “gentry 
constitutionalism” of the UK and the USA (the two countries whose gentlemanly education 
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Liang Qichao praised), creates stability and robustness in a country.77 In this way, Yao 
believes that Hayek’s Scottish moral philosophy-founded insights provide a preferable 
alternative to the Hobbesian view of politics as calculated self-interest, which Yao laments is 
currently dominant in China.78  
 Using shenshi 绅士, a term for gentleman associated with the historical gentry class 
in China, Yao postulates that there are already some gentleman amid contemporary Chinese 
entrepreneurs, but very few. He argues they are the contemporary re-generation of the gentry 
merchants tradition. Their idea of public ethics is not fully formed, Yao states, nor are there 
broad enough channels for the expression of public ethics. These gentry merchant gentlemen 
are thus not strong enough to pull against the corruption of the entire mass of entrepreneurs.79 
In Yao’s view, entrepreneurs are the most important managers and leaders of a “normal” 
country’s system of social governance, and he condemns entrepreneurs in China for 
conspiring with officials to exploit the weakest people in society. Again with similarities to 
Yu’s position, Yao argues that only traditional religion or quasi-traditional religion can shake 
them out of that corrupt state.80 Thus he lauds the increasing number of entrepreneurs who 
have turned to Buddhism and Confucianism in the last ten years.81 
 Putting this increasing interest in religion in the context of a global revival in religion 
since the 1980s, Yao writes that with regard to Christianity in China, experts have identified 
two new groups of Christian followers: “boss Christians” (laoye jidutu 老爸基督徒), 
composed of owners and directors of private enterprises; and “big city white-collar 
employees” (da chengshi de bailing 大城市的白领), which includes teachers, university 
students, doctors, lawyers, artists etc. Boss Christians establish churches and use their wealth 
for charitable purposes, and many businessmen believe in Buddhism and Daoism and 
enthusiastically support the revival of Confucianism, because religion enables them to leave 
materialism and their inner binds behind.82 Yao refers to research that shows that religious 
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businessmen are less likely to engage in immoral and illegal behaviour, and that their values 
encourage people to buy their products. With a view to religion’s emphasis away from the 
self, as with Yu, Yao writes that some entrepreneurs have already broken free from the trap 
of egoism, and have started to be concerned about their staff’s difficulties, their customers’ 
feedback, the hardships of vulnerable groups, and the good and the bad in the social order.83 
This leads them to use their resources to promote “cultural reconstruction” (wenhua 
chongjian 文化重建), and it is in this way that they can become Confucian junzi.84 Yao 
concludes that the more entrepreneurs become such junzi or even gentry businessmen, the 
more they can effectively assume public responsibilities. In Yao’s view, this is good for them 
as individuals and for Chinese society as a whole.	  
Besides entrepreneurs, Yao is also keen for middle-class professionals to aspire to 
become junzi. Professionals in general play an important role in today’s society because of 
the knowledge they possess, Yao states, which gives them a certain power and autonomy that 
he believes can be used as to balance the power of governments, the economy, and popular 
opinion. According to Yao, the development of the knowledge and autonomy of 
professionals in the Chinese context relies on them raising themselves up to be junzi, and 
only those who become junzi can organize other professionals into coherent groups and 
gradually shape professional ethical standards, through appropriate and prudent relations with 
the government and the people.85 Yao maintains that it is only through professional 
communities that professionals can raise their self-awareness, come to understand the power 
they hold, and fulfil their social duty.86 Of all today’s professionals, legal professionals are 
most engaged with junzi-like behaviour, in Yao’s view, and by self-cultivating as junzi legal 
professionals can truly delimit “justice” (yi) (the same word that is used for “righteousness”) 
by identifying appropriate and inappropriate behaviour.”87 Doctors and teachers are also 
prime candidates for junzi self-cultivation. Yao argues that the commercialisation and 
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bureaucratisation of healthcare provision can only be overcome if doctors use their autonomy 
to achieve an ethical re-awakening, and that teachers must become junzi, because it takes a 
junzi to foster a junzi.88  
Ultimately, Yao acknowledges that, generally speaking, the junzi are each and every 
field’s “elite” (jingying 精英). As elite exemplars, he argues that the junzi in each field 
possess the following attributes: high moral conduct, an authoritative presence, and the desire 
and skill to participate in public affairs. But when politicians, businessmen and scholars go 
astray, they become corrupt, show off their riches, overindulge in drink and sex, and lose 
concern for the people and public affairs.89 A key step in reconstructing Chinese culture, 
therefore, is to “tame the elite” (xunhua jingying 驯化精英). This entails every CCP school, 
every civil service college, legal college, commercial college, etc., teaching the Confucian 
classics so that students can develop their individual moral qualities, such as sincerity, and go 
on to run the country with wisdom.90 Interestingly, Yao’s sense that the elite’s excesses need 
to be “tamed” is also projected in the hugely popular online novel Huiguo xun huo ji 回国驯
火记 (“Taming the Chinese Fire”), written in installments by a rich Chinese returnee 
businessman from the US since 2003, which regales its readers with tales of a successful 
Chinese businessman and investor who returns to China from America to live a life of 
“consumerism and hedonism without bounds.”91 Although the novel has not been completed, 
Louie argues that a moral ending to the story is suggested, given the already provided 
downbeat title of the final unwritten chapter, and its intimations of the historical conventions 
of Chinese literary fiction, in which the protagonist realizes that he can only truly achieve 
happiness by abstaining from debauchery and hedonism.92 As such, Yao’s objective to tame 
the out-of-control elite through moral cultivation runs true to a deeply embedded paradigm in 
historical Chinese thinking. 
In sum, Yao’s vision for a junzi nation mixes Confucian social and political ethics 
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with Hayekian economic (neo)liberalism. Yao dreams of a dynamic, liberal market economy, 
powered by ethically outstanding junzi entrepreneurs and junzi professionals. In doing so, he 
provides a more developed model than Yu for the reconfiguration of the pursuit of material 
wealth within a Confucian moral framework. His attention to middle-class professionals 
highlights their importance as a moral cornerstone in the project of Yao and other 
intellectuals to re-Confucianize China. While undoubtedly innovative, Yao’s reliance on the 
junzi as the only figure who can make China great again is culturally nationalist, elitist, and 
possibly sexist if read as a male-only model. As such his programme stands as an attempt, 
like Yu’s, to enhance the influence of China’s intellectual class, who find their status 
diminished in comparison to their forerunners, due to the post-Mao reach of financial capital 
and global markets.  
 
“Life is about self-cultivation”: a Chinese professional’s responses to junzi discourses 
Kosaku Yoshino, a theorist of cultural nationalism, writes:  
Two groups are normally prominent in the development of cultural nationalism: 
intellectuals (or thinking elites), who formulate ideas and ideals of the nation’s 
cultural identity, and intelligentsia (or social groups with higher and further 
education), who respond to such ideas and ideals and relate them to their own social, 
economic, political and other activities.93  
In this section, in order to explore how highly educated Chinese men are responding to the 
ideas and ideals of intellectuals of the junzi, I discuss the case of Bradley, a young Chinese 
professional man whom, as mentioned above, I interviewed as part of larger project on the 
masculine subjectivities of men from China working in London. Bradley was one of the two 
project participants who explicitly cited the junzi ideal among the six who stated adherence to 
typical Confucian values. Of these two, I have chosen to focus on Bradley because he 
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specifically referenced Yu Qiuyu as a major influence on his thinking, neatly illustrating the 
link between intellectual discourse and the practices of the highly educated outlined by 
Yoshino.94 
The son of officials, in his mid-twenties and a design professional, Bradley had 
moved to the UK from east China for his high school education. When we met for the 
interview, he told me his relocation to the UK had forced him to reconsider his notions of 
China and Chinese culture. In the first place, through reading Mencius (372-289 BCE), he 
had come to the realization that “life is about self-cultivation.” He pinpointed two important 
dimensions to this: the cultivation of Confucian morals, and the Buddhist cultivation of 
personal happiness, both of which he felt were important. His mix of Confucian and Buddhist 
methods of self-cultivation resonated with Yu Qiuyu’s approach, and indeed he told me that 
he had read Yu’s work on the junzi: “Yu Qiuyu says the junzi is the cultural ideal of Chinese 
culture, like the samurai is for the Japanese. China needs more self-cultivation to be taught.” 
Bradley was particularly concerned that consumerism without a moral framing results in poor 
development of moral subjecthood. With regard to what he saw as the problematic 
consequence of this, he said: “the attention paid to creams, designer clothes, hairstyles, 
doesn’t make for interesting character. What’s missing is that self-cultivation is not being 
taught.” In this regard, his desire to insert a moral dimension into materialist lifestyles 
accords very strongly with the programs of both Yu Qiuyu and Yao Zhongqiu. 
For Bradley, the issue of self-cultivation raised interesting questions about the nature 
and exercise of the power wielded by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He expressed his 
disappointment with the CCP’s Patriotic Education program, which he felt lacked a moral 
dimension. Bradley expressed in his comments a tension between a narrow, insufficient CCP 
patriotism and his desire for a more fulfilling engagement with Chinese cultural identity. 
Moreover, for Bradley, the promotion of a masculinity founded on Confucian self-cultivation 
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was not simply desirable, but was vital for China’s political system, which he emphasized 
does not have the checks and balances of Western political systems: “I guess the Chinese way 
is harsher, more strict. Because Confucian self-cultivation cultivates one towards power, like 
a man who can hold so much power without being corrupt—that’s a much higher standard.” 
He argued that Western institutional structures prevented leaders amassing the same amount 
of power as the Chinese leader could, which necessitated the Chinese leader cultivating 
exemplary moral rectitude: “you will never give a man that much power, therefore there is no 
need for one single character to have such high moral standards as Xi Jinping 习近平 (1953–) 
or Wen Jiabao 温家宝 (1942–).”  Nevertheless, despite Bradley’s disagreement with the 
narrowness of CCP historical narratives, he did not reject the Party itself, the survival of 
which he argued depended precisely on the moral self-cultivation of its officials. Exhilarated 
by Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive, he talked of the Party staying in power for two or three 
hundred years, like a dynasty of old, if its leaders successfully fostered a junzi mentality. His 
vision, therefore, exhibited clear parallels with Yao Zhongqiu’s call for junzi political 
leadership and junzi public officials.  
When I asked Bradley to give an example of someone who embodied junzi qualities, 
Bradley named the nineteenth-century general Zeng Guofan 曾国藩(1811–1872), who in 
Bradley’s view incorporated both Confucian and Daoist principles into his performance of 
cultivated masculinity. Bradley’s choice was no doubt influenced by the vociferous lauding 
of Zeng by cultural nationalists that has taken place since the 1980s in books, TV series and 
republications of his writings.95 Zeng has been hailed as a seminal modernizer of industry and 
education, and yet at the same time “an exemplary Confucian man of literary and 
professional achievements and moral excellence.”96 Zeng was a hero of Liang Qichao, 
Chiang Kai-Shek and other Confucian nationalists in the first half of the twentieth century 
due to the major role he played in bringing a degree of stability to China through the 
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suppression of the Taiping Rebellion (1851–64).97 Liang Qichao even believed that Zeng 
could have rescued China from its weak condition at the end of the nineteenth century had he 
been alive then.98 However, Zeng became a taboo figure during the Mao years, when for the 
very same actions he was portrayed as a reactionary killer of progressive peasants and 
criticized for his Confucian values.99 Bradley most appreciated what he considered to be 
Zeng’s strength of moral character, reflecting the predominant way he has been presented in 
the post-Mao era as encapsulating “the four principal ideals of the Confucian man (achieving 
self-perfection, managing the family, governing the empire, and bringing order to all under 
heaven).”100 
Bradley also approvingly mentioned the Qing Dynasty Jinshang 晋商, morally 
minded Confucian merchants from Shanxi, whose extensive trading required the 
development of more sophisticated financial institutions. The Jinshang are one of the groups 
of merchants associated with premodern attempts to reposition Confucianism vis-à-vis the 
pursuit of wealth. Bradley’s mentioning the Jinshang reflects the prominence of several 
films, TV dramas and documentaries about them since the 1990s, which have helped cement 
the idea of a late-imperial, morally sound “Confucian business culture” (rushang wenhua 儒
商文化) that created wealth and generated taxes in responsible ways and helped the less well-
off.101 Influenced by this recently popularized understanding of Confucian-infused historical 
business practices in China, Bradley legitimized his own sense of himself as a moral man of 
business. 
  
A darker side of cultural nationalist use of the junzi 
Werner Meissner suggests that it is possible that “anti-Western ideology in China will 
become an amalgam consisting of Confucian elements, combined with set pieces of Party 
ideology, anti-Western, non-liberal philosophy, and based on an ethnic, or even, racist 
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identity.”102 He argues that the CCP could use this kind of ideology to encompass non-Han 
ethnic groups and Sinophone populations beyond China within one Chinese national identity, 
with the Chinese leadership as the core of the “Chinese nation.103 In the light of Meissner’s 
comments, one can see how Yu’s “collective junzi personality”, Yao’s “junzi nation”, and 
Bradley’s enthusiasm for Yu Qiuyu’s junzi cultural archetype and his own expression of the 
“Chinese way” of self-cultivation all easily fit the category of cultural nationalism and even 
potentially racialized nationalism, as their imputation of particular attributes to Chineseness 
and the Chinese nation excludes non-Chinese from possessing them. If everyone or every 
society or culture in the world had the potential to possess these attributes, they would cease 
to be defining features of Chineseness. 
 A clear example of racialized nationalist use of the junzi concept can be found in the 
work of author Gao Xitian 高喜田 (1956–), who has written a book entitled Way of the junzi: 
Chinese people’s philosophy for conducting themselves in society (Junzi zhi dao: 
Zhongguoren de chushi zhexue 君子之道:中国人的处世哲学). A quotation from Gao 
initiates an account of an interview with him in a 2012 article in the China Youth Daily:  
Even if peasants lived deep in the mountains for ages and ages without books or 
education, they would still understand the basis for being a junzi and not a xiaoren, 
and would guide their offspring to follow benevolence and righteousness and not 
offend Heaven and Earth. This precisely permeates the Chinese cultural genes in our 
nation’s blood (minzu xueyezhong de Zhonghua wenhua jiyin 民族血液中的中华文
化基因).104 
Gao directly acknowledges Liang Qichao’s speech promoting the personality of the junzi 
personality at Tsinghua University in 1914 as his inspiration. Yet he describes how thinking 
of Liang’s speech fills him with both excitement and sorrow. Although Gao strongly admires 
Liang’s diligent and tireless pursuit of junzi-hood, he feels despondent that in the market 
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economy of today’s China the guiding light of the junzi ideal is becoming fainter and 
fainter.105 
Culturalist /racialized sentiments similar to Gao’s are found in the preface of his book, 
which was written by Ji Baocheng 纪宝成 (1944–), a previous Principal of Beijing’s 
renowned Renmin University, where China’s first “National Studies College” (guoxue yuan 
国学院) was founded in 2005. Ji states in the preface: “There is no nation in the world like 
the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu): our cultural traditions grow without end, are 
continuous and uninterrupted, and the moral concepts and values formed thousands of years 
ago are still actively playing a role today.106 Gao anticipates the ideas of Yu Qiuyu when he 
proposes the personality of the junzi as “the ideal personality of the Chinese nation” 
(Zhonghua minzu de lixiang ren’ge 中华民族的理想人格) and “the ideal model of a perfect 
personality” (wanmei ren’ge de lixiang moxing 完美人格的理想模型).107 These sentiments 
were also echoed by Ji in his preface.108 It is through the concept of the “Chinese nation” that 
racializing nationalists subsume China’s ethnic and cultural differences under a Han-
dominated national identity. This kind of cultural and racialized nationalism inevitably 
benefits the Han as the existing hegemonic group in China.109  
 
Conclusion 
Bradley’s ethical self-makings via the appropriation of the junzi ideal are creative and 
transformative responses to the circumstances he has encountered as a transnational, well-
educated Chinese man. As an educated Chinese men living and working in a world in which 
Western power is hegemonic, he has striven to embrace a cultural nationalist reworking of 
junzi masculinity against a historical background in which Chinese masculinity has been 
undermined, challenged and erased. His refashioning of his identity seeks to link his 
masculinity with Chinese nationhood and culture in ways that thwart the ever-present 
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potential undoing of his manhood. He enfolds ideas of junzi-hood into his own subjectivity, 
invoking the junzi in inventive ways to imagine a more moral, less consumerist China, to 
promulgate a patriotism rooted in historical culture rather than CCP interests, and to reconcile 
Chinese intellectuals with marketplace economics. The increasing manifestation of the junzi 
model in internet blogs, current affairs magazines, TV programs and recently published 
books show that many other educated professional men are also invoking this model of 
masculinity in their own particular trajectories of identity-making. Indeed, despite an 
increasingly gender-neutral framing, including by Bradley and in the texts I have analysed, 
the culturally nationalist junzi model remains in everyday life mostly a preoccupation of men, 
and thus a masculine ideal. In terms of social status and privilege, the classed and gendered 
implications of junzi-type cultural nationalism particularly privilege highly-educated middle-
class men, who, unsurprisingly, form the vast majority of those promulgating the 
Confucian/junzi revival. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that the junzi is just one 
among many masculinities jostling for attention in today’s relatively pluralistic China; and 
that while interest in junzi cultivation is clearly growing, a large-scale study is needed to get a 
clearer picture of its prevalence. 
The resurgence of “traditional” Chinese cultural pursuits and identities in everyday 
activities, with the state’s acquiescence and even support in many instances, fits a global 
trend, towards the expression of identity in cultural and religious terms, due in part to 
increasing doubts across the world as to whether secular liberal or socialist approaches are 
necessarily the only possibilities for building well-grounded and stable modern societies.110 
This trend has particularly intensified since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 dealt the death knell to a viable socialist alternative to 
capitalism. As emerging economies have grown in wealth and confidence since the 1990s, in 
some cases leaving colonial era shadows further behind them, they have also felt free to 
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discard notions that modernization is synonymous with Westernization. Intellectuals such as 
Yao Zhongqiu and Yu Qiuyu are pushing Confucianism and the junzi ideal to shape a cultural 
nationalist revisioning of China’s future that they believe will raise their status. Using 
Confucianism as their foundational philosophy provides them with a usefully indirect way of 
critiquing the Communist authorities. Yu has proven particularly successful at criticising 
current norms without ever falling into taboo territory.111 The same is true for Yao’s 
promotion of Confucianism.  
Of particular note is the way that Yao and others address today’s Chinese 
professionals in their promotion of junzi masculinity. For Yao, today’s professionals, with 
their specialized knowledge and focus on mental work, must take on the mantle of cultivating 
themselves to become contemporary junzi. Such efforts are not without effect, as the example 
of Bradley shows. This negotiation of social status in a commercializing and globalizing 
China is complemented by a simultaneous negotiation of status globally. Chinese intellectual 
voices are urging the promotion of Confucian values across the world. Guan Shijie 关世杰, 
Director of the International and Intercultural Communication Program at Beijing University, 
has stated that “the time has come for the West to learn from the East….The Confucian 
concept of universal harmony will be dominant during the next century.”112 However, the 
potential danger of such approaches is the homogenization of China’s plurality of cultures to 
service a racialized Chinese nationhood. 
 Although not explicitly racial, Yu Qiuyu’s use of notions like “collective personality” 
(jiti ren’ge 集体人格) and “junzi personality” (junzi ren’ge 君子人格) furnish a “Grand 
View of Culture,” according to Haomin Gong, which Yu uses to deflect criticism of his 
scholarship. When Yu has been challenged in the past over the accuracy of details of his 
writings, he has brushed them aside, and has brought the focus back to these big ideas.113 Yu, 
and Yao, promulgate new grand narratives of the nation and national culture. But the only 
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means that they have of influencing many people with their ideas is paradoxically through the 
very mass commercial culture that they condemn as immoral and deleterious.114 It may be 
that the current hegemonic confluence of socialism and market economics in China will 
prove impossible to tame, and will continue to appropriate, and regulate, junzi visions, 
including those of Yu and Yao, for its own aims. Yet if more professional men like Bradley 
are won over, the realisation of Liang Qichao’s gentlemanly ideal will be a step closer. Yu, 
Yao and their fellow travellers know their only chance is to embed the junzi in nationalist 
sentiment. Yet, if they succeed, they may find, as Meissner warns, that they have helped 
create a rather more unpleasant regime than the one that they envisaged. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
NOTES 
1 The junzi ideal was one element in Liang’s overall vision for strong Chinese manhood. Inspired by his 
experiences in early twentieth century Japan, he also vigorously advocated the need for a cultural nationalism 
founded on the mythical “way of the warrior” (wushidao 武士道) in order to foster the Chinese people’s “martial 
spirit” (shangwu 尚武). See Oleg Benesch, “The Samurai Next Door: Chinese Examinations of the Japanese 
Martial Spirit,” Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident 38 (2014): 138–42. I am grateful to Professor Kam Louie for 
highlighting this point in comments on my presentation of an earlier version of this paper at San Francisco 
University in November 2016. 
2 Liang Qichao, “Junzi” [Gentlemen], November 5, 1914, accessed March 21, 2017, 
http://xsg.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/xsg/8351/2014/20141105093430578437891/20141105093430578437891_.ht
ml. 
3 “Influencing Tsinghua: Mr. Liang Qichao’s speech ‘Gentleman’”, July 21, 2014, accessed March 13, 2017, 
http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/newthuen/8934/2014/20140721100549039591031/20140721100549039591
031_.html. The abbreviated phrases are ziqiang buxi 自强不息 and houde zaiwu 厚德载物. 
4 Wei-ming Tu, “Cultural China,” in The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of 
Being Chinese Today, ed. Wei-ming Tu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 27.  
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masculine despite comprising both genders. By the 1920s, “modern,” “patriotic” toys were seen as crucial tools 
for the appropriate education of the minds and bodies of “new” children. See Valentina Boretti, “Small Things 
of Great Importance: Toy Advertising in China, 1910s-1930s,” Asia Pacific Perspectives 13, no. 2 (2015–16): 7, 
and passim. 
7 Kam Louie, Theorising Chinese Masculinity: Society and Gender in China (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 50; Kam Louie, “Confucius the Chameleon: Dubious Envoy for ‘Brand China’,” 
Boundary 2 38, no. 1 (2011): 80–83. 
8 Louie, Theorising Chinese Masculinity, 54–7.  
9 See Prasenjit Duara, “Provincial narratives of the nation: centralism and federalism in Republican China,” in 
Cultural Nationalism in East Asia: Representation and Identity, ed. Harumi Befu (Institute of East Asian 
Studies Research Papers and Policy Studies 39) (Berkeley: University of California, 1993), 9; see also Yingjie 
Guo, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National Identity under Reform (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 2–4.  
10 Discourses of masculinity and nationalism are often closely associated, in China and beyond. See Geng Song 
and Derek Hird, Men and Masculinities in Contemporary China (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 11–12, 34–54; and Joane 
Nagel, “Masculinity and nationalism: Gender and sexuality in the making of nations,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 
(1998): 242–69. 
11 Song and Hird, Men and Masculinities in Contemporary China, 64, 124–5. 
12 Mark Liechty, “Middle-class Deja Vu: Conditions of Possibility, From Victorian England to Contemporary 
Kathmandu,” in The Global Middle Classes: Theorizing through Ethnography, ed. Rachel Heiman et al (Santa 
Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2012), 280. 
13 Since 1989, an increasingly vocal neo-Confucian movement in China has argued for the promotion of 
traditional Confucian values as an alternative to or even replacement for the CCP’s Marxist ideology, and for a 
ruling class of virtuous Confucians who embody junzi characteristics. This culturalist movement, which is 
dominated by men, has energized historical masculine ideals such as the junzi. See Heike Holbig and Bruce 
Gilley, “In Search of Legitimacy in Post-revolutionary China: Bringing Ideology and Governance Back In,” 
	   31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems Research Program Working Paper no. 127, German Institute of 
Global and Area Studies (March 2010): 22. 
14 Tak Sing Cheung and Ambrose Yeo-chi King, “Righteousness and Profitableness: The Moral Choices of 
Contemporary Confucian Entrepreneurs,” Journal of Business Ethics 54, no. 3 (2004): 247. 
15 Louie, Chinese Masculinity, 53–7. 
16 Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 149. 
17 Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), 163–74; Louie, “Confucius the Chameleon”, 96–7; Wang Yan, “National 
Studies,” China Report 27 (2015), 16–25. 
18 Marc L. Moskowitz, Go Nation: Chinese Masculinities and the Game of Weiqi in China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2013), 74, and passim. 
19 Birdwhistell, Joanne D. Mencius and Masculinities: Dynamics of Power, Morality, and Maternal Thinking 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), 147, note 5; Lai, Karyn, “Close Personal Relationships and the Situated Self: The 
Confucian Analects and Feminist Philosophy,” in Ann A. Pang-White, ed, The Bloomsbury Research Handbook 
of Chinese Philosophy and Gender (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 120. 
20 Baidu zhidao, “Junzi jiu zhi nansheng ma? Nüsheng keyi cheng junzi ma?” [Does junzi just refer to men? 
Can women be called junzi?], accessed August 3, 2017, https://zhidao.baidu.com/question/164759431.html. 
21 Kosaku Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 
1. 
22 Guo, Cultural Nationalism, 4; Richard Madsen, “The Public Sphere, Civil Society and Moral Community: A 
Research Agenda for Contemporary China Studies,” Modern China 19, no. 2 (1993): 183–98. 
23 Stephen Shulman, “Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of Nationalism,” 
Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 5 (2002): 561–2. 
24 Lesley Wynn, “Self-Reflection in the Tub: Japanese Bathing Culture, Identity, and Cultural Nationalism,” 
Asia Pacific Perspectives 12, no. 2 (2014): 61–78.   
25 Henrietta Harrison, Inventing the Nation: China (London: Arnold, 2001), 104. 
26 Ibid. 
	   32 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Guoxue.com, “‘Zhonghua minzu’ de youlai,” [The origins of “the Chinese nation”], accessed April 7, 2017,  
http://www.guoxue.com/zt/dfyx/wz9.html. Jonathan Lipman argues that minzu should be translated as “race,” 
because he believes it still holds the sense of racial difference that was prevalent at the time of the term’s 
invention at the turn of the twentieth century. See Jonathan Lipman, “How Many Minzu in a Nation? Modern 
Travellers Meet China’s Frontier Peoples,” Inner Asia 4 (2002): 113–30. 
28 Alisa Jones, “Politics and History Curriculum Reform in Post-Mao China,” International Journal of 
Educational Research 37 (2002): 549. 
29 Qin Pang, “The Rise of Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Main Content and Causes,” Elixir 
Social Science 36 (2011): 3361–2. 
30 Zhao, A Nation-state by Construction, 148. 
31 Meissner, “Cultural and National Identity”, 16; Zhao, A Nation-state by Construction, 149–51. 
32 In particular, I drew my research methods from Michael Murray and Anneke Sools, “Narrative Research,” in 
Poul Rohleder and Antonia C. Lyons, eds., Qualitative Research in Clinical and Health Psychology 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 133–54. 
33 Cigdem Esin, Mastoureh Fathi and Corinne Squire, “Narrative Analysis: The Constructionist Approach,” in 
The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis, ed. Uwe Flick (London: Sage, 2014), 204–5; Kenneth J. 
Gergen, “The Social Construction of Self,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 644–50. For a more comprehensive account of the methodological 
considerations underlying my data collection and analysis methods in this project, see Derek Hird, “Moral 
Masculinities: Ethical Self-fashionings of Professional Chinese Men in London,” Nan Nü 18 (2016): 119–22. 
34 Paper Republic, “Wenhua ku lü” [A bitter journey through culture], accessed 7 April, 2017, https://paper-
republic.org/works/wenhua-kulv. For a discussion of some of the cultural nationalist aspects of this work, see 
Haomin Gong, “Popularization of Traditional Culture in Postsocialist China: a study of the Yu Qiuyu 
Phenomenon,” Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 69 (2011): 349-51. 
35 Qiuyu Yu, Junzi zhi dao [The Way of the Gentleman] (Beijing: Beijing lianhe chuban gongsi, 2014), 1–2. 
36 Yu adds the English word “personality” in brackets, adumbrating an Anglophone/Western dimension to his 
argument. 
37 Yu, Junzi zhi dao, 3–4. 
38 Ibid., 5–6. 
	   33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Available at http://www.iging.com/intro/foreword.htm. 
40 Yu, Junzi zhi dao, 8–9. 




45 Ibid., 10. 
46 Ibid. 





52 Ibid., 15. 
53 Ibid., 133–49; Miao Kai, “Yu Qiuyu Taiwan kaijiang: zhenzhneg de da junzi yiding qinjin fojiao” [Yu Qiuyu 
lectures in Taiwan: the truly great junzi certainly gets close to Buddhism], accessed April 7, 2017, 
http://fo.ifeng.com/a/20150309/41001381_0.shtml. 
54 C. Julia Huang, Charisma and Compassion: Cheng Yen and the Buddhist Tzu Chi Movement (Cambridge, 
MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
55 Miao Kai, “Yu Qiuyu Taiwan kaijiang.” 
56 See Gong, Popularization of Traditional Culture, for a similar argument in relation to Yu’s “cultural prose.” 
57 Yao Zhongqiu, Meide; junzi; fengsu [“Virtue; junzi; social customs”] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang daxue 
chubanshe, 2012), 1–2. 
58 Ibid., 2. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
	   34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ibid., 3. Yao’s use of he er bu tong comes from a saying of Confucius in the Lunyu (Analects of Confucius): 
junzi he er bu tong, xiaoren tong er bu he 君子和而不同，小人同而不和, which can be glossed as: “the junzi 
maintains harmonious and friendly relations with others, but does not blindly agree with them; the xiaoren 
panders to and parrots the opinions of others, but does not harbor a harmonious and friendly attitude towards 
them in his heart.” See Baidu baike, “Junzi he er bu tong,” accessed April 7, 2017, 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/2925692.htm. 
62 Yao, Meide; junzi; fengsu, 3. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 77. 
65 Ibid., 93. 
66 Ibid., 85. 
67 Ibid., 84. 
68 Ibid., 86. 
69 Ibid., 86-9. 
70 Ibid., 93. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 94. 
73 Ibid., 100. 
74 Ibid., 102. 
75 Yao Zhongqiu, “Lifa qiyejia zhidu shengcheng: Men’geer zhidu lilun chongshu” [The Rule-Making 
Entrepreneur and Institutional Formation: Re-examining the Institutional Theory of Carl Menger], Journal of 
Guangdong University of Business Studies 3 (2009): 28–36, 59. 
76 Yao, Meide; junzi; fengsu, 103. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 185. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 186. 
	   35 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 186–7. 
85 Ibid., 204. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., 190. 
88 Ibid., 211-13. 
89 Ibid., 223. 
90 Ibid., 236. 
91 Kam Louie, “Globe-Trotting Chinese Masculinity: Wealthy, Worldly, and Worthy,” in Diasporic 
Chineseness after the Rise of China: Communities and Cultural Production, ed. Julia Kuehn et al, (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2013), 59. 
92 Ibid., 66. 
93 Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan, 1. 
94 For an extended discussion of the ethical dimensions to the subjectivities of Bradley and the other participant 
who aspired to junzi masculinity, see Derek Hird, “Moral Masculinities: Ethical Self-fashionings of Professional 
Chinese Men in London,” Nan Nü 18 (2016): 115–47. 
95 Guo, Cultural Nationalism, 49. 
96 Ibid., 55. 
97 Ibid., 51; Pang, “The Rise of Cultural Nationalism,” 3362. 
98 Guo, Cultural Nationalism, 51. 
99 Ibid., 52. Pang, “The Rise of Cultural Nationalism,” 3362.  
100 Guo, Cultural Nationalism, 62. 
101 Shuyu Kong, “Cultural Propaganda in the Age of Economic Reform: Popular Media and the Social 
Construction of Shanxi Merchants in Contemporary China,” The China Journal 63 (2010): 79–99. 
102 Werner Meissner, “China's Search for Cultural and National Identity from the Nineteenth Century to the 
Present,” China Perspectives 68 (2006): 16, accessed April 7, 2017, https://chinaperspectives.revues.org/3103. 
103 Ibid., 16. 
	   36 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Chong Huang, “Women shehui yao chuangxin yizhong jizhi rang junzi geng rongyi chenggong” [Our 
society must create a kind of mechanism to allow junzi to gain success more easily], Zhongguo qingnian bao 





108 Baocheng Ji, “Guoxue nai wenhua zhi gen, minzu zhi hun” [National Studies is the root of culture and the 
soul of the nation], accessed April 7, 2017, http://cul.china.com.cn/book/2011-08/11/content_4398553.htm. 
109 Cheng (2011) argues that the discourse of patriotic nationalism in China is characterised by a hegemonic 
Han racial chauvinism that excludes non-Han ethnicities from the scope of the term Zhonghua minzu. Rae and 
Wang’s survey of over 1000 respondents from eighteen universities in China found that on the question of 
national identity “Han identity was often fused with the larger Chinese identity . . . leading to Han chauvinism 
that remains problematic for non-Han people today” (2016, 487).  
110 Scott Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The 
Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
111 Gong, “Traditional Culture in Postsocialist China,” 348. 
112 Pang, “The Rise of Cultural Nationalism,” 3362. 
113 Gong, “Traditional Culture in Postsocialist China,” 355. 




Bell, Daniel A. China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing 
Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
Benesch, Oleg. “The Samurai Next Door: Chinese Examinations of the Japanese Martial 
Spirit.” Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident 38 (2014): 129–68. 
	   37 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Baidu baike 百度百科. “Junzi he er bu tong” 君子和而不同 [The junzi fosters harmonious 
relations but remains independent-minded]. Accessed April 7, 2017. 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/2925692.htm. 
Baidu zhidao 百度知道. “Junzi jiu zhi nansheng ma? Nüsheng keyi cheng junzi ma?” 君子
就指男生吗? 女生可以称君子吗? [Does junzi just refer to men? Can women be 
called junzi?]. Accessed August 3, 2017. 
https://zhidao.baidu.com/question/164759431.html. 
Birdwhistell, Joanne D. Mencius and Masculinities: Dynamics of Power, Morality, and 
Maternal Thinking. Albany: SUNY Press, 2007. 
Boretti, Valentina. “Small Things of Great Importance: Toy Advertising in China, 1910s–
1930s.” Asia Pacific Perspectives 13, no. 2 (2015-16): 5–48. 
Cheung, Tak Sing, and Ambrose Yeo-chi King. “Righteousness and Profitableness: The 
Moral Choices of Contemporary Confucian Entrepreneurs.” Journal of Business 
Ethics 54, no. 3 (2004): 245–60. 
Cheng, Yinghong 程映虹. 2011. “Dangdai Zhongguo de zhongzuzhuyi yanshuo” 当代中国
的种族主义言说 [The Discourse of Racism in Contemporary China]. Wenhua 
zongheng 文化纵横 [Cultural intersections] 4, April 20. Accessed August 2, 2017. 
www.21bcr.com/a/shiye/guancha/2011/0420/2640.html. 
Duara, Prasenjit. “Provincial Narratives of the Nation: Centralism and Federalism in 
Republican China.” In Cultural Nationalism in East Asia: Representation and Identity 
(Institute of East Asian Studies Research Papers and Policy Studies 39), edited by 
Harumi Befu, 9–35. Berkeley: University of California, 1993. 
	   38 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Esin, Cigdem, Mastoureh Fathi, and Corinne Squire. “Narrative Analysis: The 
Constructionist Approach.” In The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis, 
edited by Uwe Flick, 203–17. London: Sage, 2014. 
Gao, Xitian 高喜田. Junzi zhi dao: Zhongguoren de chushi zhexue 君子之道—中国人的处
世哲学 [Way of the junzi: Chinese people’s philosophy for conducting themselves in 
society]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2012. 
Gergen, Kenneth J. “The Social Construction of Self.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Self, 
edited by Shaun Gallagher, 633–53. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Gong, Haomin. “Popularization of Traditional Culture in Postsocialist China: a study of the 
Yu Qiuyu Phenomenon.” Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 69 (2011): 349–51. 
Guo, Yingjie. Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National 
Identity under Reform. London: Routledge, 2004. 
Guoxue.com. “‘Zhonghua minzu’ de youlai” “中华民族”的由来 [The origins of “Zhonghua 
minzu”]. Accessed April 7, 2017.  http://www.guoxue.com/zt/dfyx/wz9.html. 
Harrison, Henrietta. Inventing the Nation: China. London: Arnold, 2001. 
Hibbins, Ray. “Migration and Gender Identity among Chinese Skilled Male Migrants to 
Australia.” Geoforum 36, no. 2 (2005): 167–80. 
Hinsch, Bret. Masculinities in Chinese History. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013.  
Hird, Derek. “Moral Masculinities: Ethical Self-fashionings of Professional Chinese Men in 
London.” Nan Nü 18 (2016): 115–47. 
Holbig, Heike, and Bruce Gilley. “In Search of Legitimacy in Post-revolutionary China: 
Bringing Ideology and Governance Back In.” Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political 
	   39 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Systems Research Program Working Paper no. 127. German Institute of Global and 
Area Studies, March 2010. 
Huang, C. Julia. Charisma and Compassion: Cheng Yen and the Buddhist Tzu Chi 
Movement. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2009.  
Huang, Chong 黄冲. “Women shehui yao chuangxin yizhong jizhi rang junzi geng rongyi 
chenggong” 我们社会要创新一种机制让君子更容易成功 [Our society must create 
a kind of mechanism to allow junzi to gain success more easily]. Zhongguo qingnian 
bao 中国青年报 [China Youth Daily], January 19, 2012. Accessed April 7, 2017. 
http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2012-01/19/nw.D110000zgqnb_20120119_1-07.htm. 
“Influencing Tsinghua: Mr. Liang Qichao’s speech ‘Gentleman’”, July 21, 2014. Accessed 
March 13, 2017. 
http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/newthuen/8934/2014/2014072110054903959103
1/20140721100549039591031_.html. 
Ji, Baocheng 纪宝成. “Guoxue nai wenhua zhi gen, minzu zhi hun” 国学乃文化之根、民族
之魂 [National Studies is the root of culture and the soul of the nation]. Accessed 
April 7, 2017. http://cul.china.com.cn/book/2011-08/11/content_4398553.htm. 
Jones, Alisa. “Politics and History Curriculum Reform in Post-Mao China.” International 
Journal of Educational Research 37 (2002): 545–66. 
Kong, Shuyu. “Cultural Propaganda in the Age of Economic Reform: Popular Media and the 
Social Construction of Shanxi Merchants in Contemporary China.” The China 
Journal 63 (2010): 79–99. 
Lai, Karyn, “Close Personal Relationships and the Situated Self: The Confucian Analects and 
Feminist Philosophy,” in Ann A. Pang-White, ed, The Bloomsbury Research 
	   40 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Handbook of Chinese Philosophy and Gender, 111–26. New York: Bloomsbury, 
2016. 




Liechty, Mark. “Middle-class Deja Vu: Conditions of Possibility, From Victorian England to 
Contemporary Kathmandu.” In The Global Middle Classes: Theorizing through 
Ethnography, edited by Rachel Heiman, Carla Freeman, and Mark Liechty, 271–99. 
Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2012. 
Lipman, Jonathan. “How Many Minzu in a Nation? Modern Travellers Meet China’s Frontier 
Peoples.” Inner Asia 4 (2002): 113–30. 
Louie, Kam. Theorising Chinese Masculinity: Society and Gender in China. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
_______. “Confucius the Chameleon: Dubious Envoy for ‘Brand China’.” Boundary 2 38, 
no. 1 (2011): 77–100. 
_______. “Globe-Trotting Chinese Masculinity: Wealthy, Worldly, and Worthy,” in 
Diasporic Chineseness after the Rise of China: Communities and Cultural 
Production, edited by Julia Kuehn, Kam Louie, and David M. Pomfret, 47-66. 
Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013. 
_______. Chinese Masculinities in a Globalizing World. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015. 
Madsen, Richard. “The Public Sphere, Civil Society and Moral Community: A Research 
Agenda for Contemporary China Studies.” Modern China 19, no. 2 (1993): 183–98. 
	   41 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Meissner, Werner. “China's Search for Cultural and National Identity from the Nineteenth 
Century to the Present.” China Perspectives 68 (2006). Accessed April 7, 2017. 
https://chinaperspectives.revues.org/3103. 
Miao Kai, “Yu Qiuyu Taiwan kaijiang: zhenzhneg de da junzi yiding qinjin fojiao” 余秋雨台
湾开讲：真正的大君子一定亲近佛教 [Yu Qiuyu lectures in Taiwan: the truly great 
junzi certainly gets close to Buddhism]. Accessed April 7, 2017. 
http://fo.ifeng.com/a/20150309/41001381_0.shtml. 
Moskowitz, Marc L. Go Nation: Chinese Masculinities and the game of Weiqi in China. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013. 
Nagel, Joane. “Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of 
Nations.” Ethnic and Racial Studies (1998): 242–69. 
Pang, Qin. “The Rise of Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Main Content and 
Causes.” Elixir Social Science 36 (2011): 3361–5. 
Paper Republic, “Wenhua ku lü” 文化苦旅 [A bitter journey through culture]. Accessed 7 
April, 2017. https://paper-republic.org/works/wenhua-kulv/.  
Rae, James DeShaw, and Xiaodan Wang. “Placing Race, Culture, and the State in Chinese 
National Identity: Han, Hua, or Zhongguo?” Asian Politics & Policy 8, no. 3 (2016): 
474–93. 
Shulman, Stephen. “Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of 
Nationalism.” Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 5 (2002): 554–85. 
Song, Geng, and Derek Hird. Men and Masculinities in Contemporary China. Leiden: Brill, 
2014. 
	   42 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Thomas, Scott. The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International 
Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
Tu, Wei-ming. “Cultural China.” In The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being 
Chinese Today, edited by Wei-ming Tu, 1–34. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1994. 
Wang, Yan. “National Studies.” China Report 27 (2015): 16–25. 
Wynn, Lesley. “Self-Reflection in the Tub: Japanese Bathing Culture, Identity, and Cultural 
Nationalism.” Asia Pacific Perspectives 12, no. 2 (2014): 61–78.   
Yao, Zhongqiu 姚中秋. “Lifa qiyejia zhidu shengcheng: Men’geer zhidu lilun chongshu” 
[The Rule-Making Entrepreneur and Institutional Formation: Re-examining the 
Institutional Theory of Carl Menger]. Journal of Guangdong University of Business 
Studies 3 (2009): 28–36, 59. 
_______. Meide; junzi; fengsu 美德・君子・风俗 [“Virtue; junzi; social customs”]. 
Hangzhou: Zhejiang daxue chubanshe, 2012. 
Yoshino, Kosaku. Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan. London and New York: 
Routledge, 1992. 
Yu, Qiuyu 余秋雨, Junzi zhi dao 君子之道  [The Way of the Gentleman]. Beijing: Beijing 
lianhe chuban gongsi, 2014. 
Zhao, Suisheng.  A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 
